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Abstract
As algorithmic prediction systems have become widespread, fears that these systems may
inadvertently discriminate against members of underrepresented populations have grown. With
the goal of understanding fundamental principles that underpin the growing number of ap-
proaches to mitigating algorithmic discrimination, we investigate the role of information in fair
prediction. A common strategy for decision-making uses a predictor to assign individuals a risk
score; then, individuals are selected or rejected on the basis of this score. In this work, we study
a formal framework for measuring the information content of predictors. Central to the frame-
work is the notion of a refinement, first studied by [DF81]. Intuitively, a refinement of a predictor
z increases the overall informativeness of the predictions without losing the information already
contained in z. We show that increasing information content through refinements improves the
downstream selection rules across a wide range of fairness measures (e.g. true positive rates,
false positive rates, selection rates). In turn, refinements provide a simple but effective tool for
reducing disparity in treatment and impact without sacrificing the utility of the predictions.
Our results suggest that in many applications, the perceived “cost of fairness” results from an
information disparity across populations, and thus, may be avoided with improved information.
1 Introduction
As algorithmic predictions are increasingly employed as parts of systems that classify people, con-
cerns that such classfiers may be biased or discriminatory have increased correspondingly. These
concerns are far from hypothetical; disparate treatment on the basis of sensitive features, like race
and gender, has been well-documented in diverse algorithmic application domains [BG18,BCZ+16,
FK18]. As such, researchers across fields like computer science, machine learning, and economics
have responded with many works aiming to address the serious issues of fairness and unfairness
that arise in automated decision-making systems.1
While most researchers studying algorithmic fairness can agree on the high-level objectives of the
field (e.g., to ensure individuals are not mistreated on the basis of protected attributes; to promote
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1Moritz Hardt’s lecture communicates this trend quite succinctly. https://fairmlclass.github.io/1.html#/4
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social well-being and justice across populations), there is much debate about how to translate these
normative aspirations into a concrete, formal definition of what it means for a prediction system
to be fair. Indeed, as this nascent field has progressed, the efforts to promote “fair prediction”
have grown increasingly divided, rather than coordinated. Exacerbating the problem, [MPB18]
identifies that each new approach to fairness makes its own set of assumptions, often implicitly,
leading to contradictory notions about the right way to approach fairness [Cho17, KMR17]; these
inconsistencies add to the “serious challenge for cataloguing and comparing defintions” [MPB18].
Complicating matters further, recent works [LDR+18,CG18] have identified shortcomings of many
well-established notions of fairness. At the extreme, these works argue that blindly requiring certain
statistical fairness conditions may in fact harm the communities they are meant to protect.
The state of the literature makes clear that choosing an appropriate notion of fairness for prediction
tasks is a challenging affair. Increasingly, fairness is viewed as a context-dependent notion [SbF+19,
HM19], where the “right” notion for a given task should be informed by conversations between
computational and social scientists. In the hopes of unifying some of the many directions of research
in the area, we take a step back and ask whether there are guiding princples that broadly serve the
high-level goals of “fair” prediction, without relying too strongly on any specific notion of fairness.
The present work argues that understanding the “informativeness” of predictions needs to be part
of any sociotechnical conversation about the fairness of a prediction system. Our main contribution
is to provide a technical language with strong theoretical backing to discuss informational issues in
the context of fair prediction.
Our contributions. Towards the goal of understanding common themes across algorithmic fair-
ness, we investigate the role of information in fair prediction. We study a formal notion of in-
formativeness in predictions and demonstrate that it serves as an effective tool for understanding
and improving the utility, fairness, and impact of downstream decisions. In short, we identify that
many “failures” of requiring fairness in prediction systems can be explained by an information dis-
parity across subpopulations. Further, we provide algorithmic tools that aim to counteract these
failures by improving informativeness. Importantly, the framework is not wedded to any specific
fairness desideratum and can be applied broadly to prediction settings where discrimination may
be a concern. Our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
• First and foremost, we identify informativeness as a key fairness desideratum. We provide
information-theoretic and algorithmic tools for reasoning about how much an individual’s pre-
diction reveals about their eventual outcome. Our formulation clarifies the intuition that more
informative predictions should enable fairer outcomes, across a wide array of interpretations
of what it means to be “fair.” Notably, calibration plays a key technical role in this reasoning;
the information-theoretic framework we present relies intimately on the assumption that the
underlying predictors are calibrated. Indeed, our results demonstrate a surprising application
of these calibration-based methods towards improving parity-based fairness criteria, running
counter to the conventional wisdom that calibration and parity are completely at odds with
one another.
• In Section 3, we provide a self-contained exposition of the framework we use to study the in-
formation content of a predictor. Information content formally quantifies the uncertainty over
individuals’ outcomes given their predictions. Leveraging properties of calibrated predictors,
we show that the information content of a predictor is directly related to the information loss
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between the true risk distribution and the predicted risk distribution. Therefore, in many
cases, information content – a measurable characteristic of the predicted risk distribution –
can serve as a proxy for reasoning about the information disparity across groups. To compare
the information content of multiple predictors, we need a key concept called a refinement ; in-
formally, a refinement of a predictor increases the overall information content, without losing
any of the original information. Refinements provide the technical tool for reasoning about
how to improve prediction quality.
• In Section 4, we revisit the question of finding an optimal fair selection rule. For prominent
parity-based fairness desiderata, we show that the optimal selection rule can be characterized
as the solution to a certain linear program, based on the given predictor. We prove that
improving the information content of these predictions via refinements results in a Pareto
improvement of the resulting program in terms of utility, disparity, and long-term impact.
As one concrete example, if we hold the selection rule’s utility constant, then refining the
underlying predictions causes the disparity between groups to decrease. Additionally, we prove
that at times, the cost associated with requiring fairness should be blamed on a lack of
information about important subpopulations, not on the fairness desideratum itself.
• In Section 5, we describe a simple algorithm, merge, for incorporating disparate sources of
information into a single calibrated predictor. The merge operation can be implemented
efficiently, both in terms of time and sample complexity. Along the way in our analysis,
we introduce the concept of refinement distance – a measure of how much two predictors’
knowledge “overlaps” – that may be of independent interest.
Finally, a high-level contribution of the present work is to clarify challenges in achieving fairness in
prediction tasks. Our framework for tracking and improving information is particularly compelling
because it does not requires significant technical background in information theory nor algorithms
to understand. We hope the framework will facilitate interactions between computational and
social scientists to further unify the literature on fair prediction, and ultimately, effect change in
the fairness of real-world prediction systems.
1.1 Why information?
We motivate the study of information content in fair prediction by giving an intuitive overview of
how information disparities can lead to unfair treatment and impact. We scaffold our discussion
around examples from two recent works [LDR+18, CG18] that raise concerns about using broad-
strokes statistical tests as the definition of fairness. This overview will be informal, prioritizing
intuition over technicality; see Section 2 for the formal preliminaries.
We consider a standard prediction setting where a decision maker, who we call the lender, has
access to a predictor z : X → [0, 1]; from the predicted risk score z(x), the decison maker must
choose whether to accept or reject the individual x ∈ X , i.e. whether to give x a loan or not. For
each individual x ∈ X , we assume there is an associated outcome y ∈ {0, 1} representing if they
would default or repay a given loan (0 and 1, respectively). Throughout, we will be focused on
calibrated predictors. Intuitively, calibration requires that a predicted score of z(x) = p corresponds
to the same level of risk, regardless of whether x ∈ A or x ∈ B. More technically, this means that
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we can think of z(x) = p as a conditional probability ; that is, amongst the individuals who receive
score z(x) = p, a p-fraction of them end up having y = 1. For simplicity, we assume there are two
disjoint subpopulations A,B ⊆ X . The works of [LDR+18, CG18] mainly focus on settings where
there are material differences between the distribution of y in the populations A and B, arguing
that these differences can lead to undesirable outcomes. We argue that even if the true risk of
individuals from A and B are identically distributed, differences in the distribution of predicted
risk scores give rise to the same pitfalls.
A caution against parity. [LDR+18] focuses on notions of fairness that require parity between
groups. One notion they study is demographic parity, which requires that the selection rate between
groups A and B be equal; that is, Pr[x selected
∣∣ x ∈ A] = Pr[x selected ∣∣ x ∈ B]. Suppose that
the majority of applicants come from group A and that on-average, members of A tend to have
higher predictions according to z. In such a setting, an unconstrained utility-maximizing lender
would give out loans at a higher rate in A than in B. The argument in [LDR+18] against requiring
demographic parity goes as follows: a lender who is constrained to satisfy demographic parity must
either give out fewer loans in A or more in B; because the lender does not want to give up utility
from loaning to A, the constrained lender will give out more loans in B. [LDR+18] argue that in
many reasonable settings, the lender will end up loaning to underqualified individuals in B who
are unlikely to repay; thus, the default rate in B will increase significantly. In their model, this
increased default rate translates into negative impact on the population B, whose members may go
into debt and become even less creditworthy.
A caution against calibration. In general, [CG18] advocates for the use of calibrated score
functions paired with threshold selection policies, where an individual is selected if z(x) > τ for
some fixed, group-independent threshold τ . Still, they caution that threshold policies paired with
calibrated predictors are not sufficient to guarantee equitable treatment. In particular, suppose that
the lender is willing to accept individuals if they have at least 0.7 probability of returning the loan.
But now consider a set of calibrated risk scores where the scores are much more confident about A
than about B; at the extreme, suppose that for x ∈ A, z(x) ∈ {0, 1} (i.e. perfect predictions) and
for x ∈ B, z(x) = 0.5 (i.e. uniform predictions). In this case, using a fixed threshold of τ = 0.7 will
select every qualified individual in A and none of the individuals from B, even though, by the fact
that z is calibrated, half of them were qualified. Worse yet, even if we try to select more members
of B, every member of B has a 0.5 probability of defaulting. Indeed, in this example, we cannot
distinguish between the individuals in B because they all receive the same score z(x). In other
words, we have no information within the population B even though the predictor was calibrated.
These examples make clear that when there are actual differences in the risk score distributions
between populations A and B, seemingly-natural approaches to ensuring fairness – enforcing par-
ity amongst groups or setting a group-independent threshold – may result in a disservice to the
underrepresented population. These works echo a perspective raised by [DHP+12] that emphasizes
the distinction between requiring broad-strokes demographic parity as a constraint versus stating
parity as a desideratum. Even if we believe that groups should ideally be treated similarly, defining
fairness as satisfying a set of hard constraints may have unintended consequences.
Note that the arguments above relied on differences in the predicted risk scores z(x) for x ∈ A and
x ∈ B, but not the true underlying risk. This observation has two immediate corollaries. On the one
hand, in both of these vignettes, if the predicted score distributions are different between population
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A and B, then such approaches to fairness could still cause harm, even if the true score distributions
are identically distributed. On the other hand, just because A and B look different according to
the predicted scores, they may not actually be different. Intuitively, the difference between the
true risk distribution and the observed risk distribution represents a certain “information loss.”
Optimistically, if we could somehow improve the informativeness of the predicted scores to reflect
the underlying populations more accurately, then the resulting selection rule might exhibit less
disparity between A and B in both treatment and impact.
Concretely, suppose we’re given a set of predicted risk scores where the scores in A tend to be much
more extreme (towards 0 and 1) than those of B. Differences in the risk score distributions such as
these can arise for one of two reasons: either individuals from B are inherently more stochastic and
unpredictable than those in A; or somewhere along the risk estimation pipeline, more information
was lost about B than about A. Understanding which story is true can be challenging, if not
impossible. Still, in cases where we can reject the hypothesis that certain individuals are inherently
less predictable than others, the fundamental question to ask is how to recover the lost information
in our predictions. In this work, we provide tools to answer this question.
Refinements. Here, we give a technical highlight of the notion of a refinement and the role
refinements serve in improving fairness. In Section 3, we introduce the concept of information
content, I(z) which gives a global measure of how informative a calibrated predictor z is over the
population of individuals; intuitively, as I(z) increases, the uncertainty in a typical individual’s
outcome decreases. The idea that more information in predictions could lead to better utility or
better fairness is not particularly surprising. Still, this intuition on its own presents some challenges.
For example, suppose we’re concerned about minimizing the false positive rate (the fraction of the
population where y = 0 that were selected). Because I is a global measure of uncertainty over all
of X , I(z) could be very high due to confidence about a population S0 ⊆ X that is very likely to
have y = 0 (z(x) close to 0), even though z gives very little information (z(x) far from 0 or 1)
about the rest of X , which consists of a mix of y = 0 and y = 1. In this case, a predictor z′ with
less information (I(z′)), but better certainty about even a tiny part of the population where y = 1
(z(x) close to 1) would enable lower false positive rates (with nontrivial selection rate).
As such, we need another way to reason about what it means for one set of predicted risk scores
to have “better information” than the other. Refinements provide the key tool for comparing the
information of predictors. Intuitively, a calibrated predictor ρ : X → [0, 1] is a refinement of z
if ρ hasn’t forgotten any of the information contained by z. Formally, we say that ρ refines z if
Ex∼X [ρ(x)
∣∣ z(x) = v] = v; this definition is closely related to the idea of calibration in a sense
that we make formal in Proposition 3.2.
Refinements allow us to reason about how information influences a broad range of quantities of
interest in the context of fair prediction. To give a sense of this, consider the following lemma,
which we use to prove our main result in Section 4, but is also independently interesting. The
lemma shows that under any fixed selection rate β = Prx∼X [f(x) = 1], the true positive rates,
false positive rates, and positive predictive value all improve with a nontrivial refinement.
Lemma. If ρ is a refinement of z, then for all selection rates β ∈ [0, 1],
TPRρ(β) ≥ TPRz(β), FPRρ(β) ≤ FPRz(β), PPVρ(β) ≥ PPVz(β).
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Intuitively, the lemma shows that by improving information through refinements, mutliple key fair-
ness quantities improve simultaneously. Leveraging this lemma and other properties of refinements
and calibration, we show that for many different ways a decision-maker might choose their “opti-
mal” selection rule, the “quality” of the selection rule improves under refinements. We highlight
this lemma as one example of the broad applicability of the refinement concept in the context of
fair prediction.
Perspective. Disparities in the information content of risk scores may arise for many reasons.
The present work clarifies how disparities across groups at early stages of the decision-making
pipeline may contribute to disparities in the downstream decisions. In particular, differences in
the availability or quality of training data as well as optimization procedures that are tailored for
performance in the majority population could contribute to information loss in the minority. The
present work highlights the importance of auditing existing risk score predictors for information
content across groups, and demonstrates that obtaining informative calibrated predictions can
improve fair selection rules, even when the fairness desiderata are based on parity.
Organization. The manuscript is structured as follows: Section 2 establishes notation and covers
the necessary preliminaries; Section 3 provides the technical framework for measuring information
in predictors; Section 4 demonstrates how improving information content improves the resulting
fair selection rules; and Section 5 describes the merge algorithm for combining and refining multiple
predictors. We conclude with a brief discussion of the context of this work and some directions for
future investigation.
1.2 Related Works
The influential work of [DHP+12] provided two observations that are of particular relevance to
the present work. First, [DHP+12] emphasized the pitfalls of hoping to achieve “fairness through
blindness” by censoring sensitive information during prediction. Second, the work highlighted how
enforcing broad-strokes demographic parity conditions – even if desired or expected in fair outcomes
– is insufficient to imply fairness. Our results can be viewed as providing further evidence for these
perspectives. As discussed earlier, understanding the ways in which fair treatment can fail to provide
fair outcomes [CG18,LDR+18] provided much of the motivation for this work. For a comprehensive
overview of the literature on the growing list of approaches to fairness in prediction systems, we
recommend the recent encyclopedic survey of [MPB18].
A few recent works have (implicitly or explicitly) touched on the relationship between information
and fairness. [CJS18] argues that discrimination may arise in prediction systems due to disparity in
predictive power; they advocate for addressing discrimination through data collection. Arguably,
much of the work on fairness in online prediction [JKMR16] can be seen as a way to gather
information while maintaining fairness. Recently, issues of information and fairness were also
studied in unsupervised learning tasks [STM+18]. From the computational economics literature,
[KLMR18] presents a simple planning model that draws similar qualitative conclusions to this work,
demonstrating the significance of trustworthy information as a key factor in algorithmic fairness.
The idea that better information improves the lender’s ability to make useful and fair predictions
may seem intuitive under our framing. Interestingly, different framings of prediction and informa-
tiveness can lead to qualitatively different conclusions. Specifically, the original work on delayed
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impact [LDR+18] suggests that some forms of misestimation (i.e. loss of information) may reduce
the potential for harm from applying parity-based fairness notions. In particular, if the lender’s
predictor z is miscalibrated in a way that underestimates the quality of a group S, then increasing
the selection rate beyond the global utility-maximizing threshold may be warranted. In our set-
ting, because we assume that the lender’s predictions are calibrated, this type of systematic bias in
predictions cannot occur, and more information always improves the resulting selection rule. This
discrepancy further demonstrates the importance of group calibration to our notion of information
content.
Other works [KRZ19, ILZ19] have investigated the role of hiding information through strategic
signaling. In such settings, it may be strategic for a group to hide information about individuals in
order to increase the overall selection rate for the group. These distinctions highlight the fact that
understanding exactly the role of information in “fair” prediction is subtle and also depends on the
exact environment of decision-making. We further discuss how to interpret our theorems as well as
the importance of faithfully translating fairness desiderata into mathematical constraints/objectives
in Section 6.
The present work can also be viewed as further investigating the tradeoffs between calibration and
parity. Inspired by investigative reporting on the “biases” of the COMPAS recidivism prediction
system [ALMK16], the incompatability of calibration and parity-based notions of fairness has re-
ceived lots of attention in recent years [Cho17,KMR17,PRW+17]. Perhaps counterintuitively, our
work shows how to leverage properties of calibrated predictors to improve the disparity of the even-
tual decisions. At a technical level, our techniques are similar in flavor to the those of [HKRR18],
which investigates how to strengthen group-level calibration as a notion of fairness; we discuss
further connections to [HKRR18] in Section 6.
Outside the literature on fair prediction, our notions of information content and refinements are
related to other notions from the fields of online forecasting and information theory. In particular,
the idea of refinements was first introduced in [DF81]. The concept of information content of
calibrated predictions is related to ideas from the forecasting literature [GBR07, GR07], including
sharpness and proper scoring rules [Bri50]. The concept of a refinement of a calibrated predictor
can be seen as a special case of Blackwell’s informativeness criterion [Bla53,Cre´82,DF81].
2 Preliminaries
Basic notation. Let X denote the domain of individuals and Y = {0, 1} denote the binary
outcome space. We assume that individuals and their outcomes are jointly distributed according
to D supported on X × Y. Let x, y ∼ D denote an independent random draw from D. For a
subpopulation S ⊆ X , we use the shorthand x, y ∼ DS to be the data distribution conditioned on
x ∈ S, and x ∼ S to denote a random sample from the marginal distribution over X conditioned
on membership in S.
Predictors. A basic goal in learning is to find a classifier f : X → {0, 1} that given x ∼ X
drawn from the marginal distribution over individuals, accurately predicts their outcome y. One
common strategy for binary classification first maps individuals to a real-valued score using a
predictor z : X → [0, 1] and then selects individuals on the basis of this score. We denote by
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supp(z) the support of z. We denote by p∗ : X → [0, 1] the Bayes optimal predictor, where
p∗(x) = PrD
[
y = 1
∣∣ x] represents the inherent uncertainty in the outcome given the individual.
Equivalently, for each individual x ∈ X , their outcome y is drawn independently from Ber(p∗(x)),
the Bernoulli distribution with expectation p∗(x). While we use [0, 1] to denote the codomain of
predictors, throughout this work, we assume that the set of individuals is finite and hence, the
support of any predictor is a discrete, finite subset of the interval.
Risk score distributions. Note that there is a natural bijection between predictors and score
distributions. A predictor z, paired with the marginal distribution over X , induces a score distri-
bution, which we denote Rz, supported on [0, 1], where the probability density function is given as
Rz(v) = Prx∼X [z(x) = v]. For a subpopulation S ⊆ X , we denote by RzS the score distribution
conditioned on x ∈ S.
Calibration. A useful property of predictors is called calibration, which implies that the scores
can be interpreted meaningfully as the probability that an individual will result in a positive
outcome. Calibration has been studied extensively in varied contexts, notably in forecasting and
online prediction (e.g. [FV98]), and recently as a fairness desideratum [KMR17,PRW+17,HKRR18,
CG18]; the definition we use is adapted from the fairness literature.
Definition (Calibration). A predictor z : X → [0, 1] is calibrated on a subpopulation S ⊆ X if for
all v ∈ supp(z),
Pr
x,y∼DS
[
y = 1
∣∣ z(x) = v] = v.
For convenience when discussing calibration, we use the notation Sz(x)=v = {x ∈ S : z(x) = v}.
Note that we can equivalently define calibration with respect to the Bayes optimal predictor, where
z is calibrated on S if for all v ∈ supp(z), Ex∼Sz(x)=v [p∗(x)] = v. Operationally in proofs, we end
up using this definition of calibration. This formulation also makes clear that p∗ is calibrated on
every subpopulation.
Parity-based fairness. As a notion of fairness, calibration aims to ensure similarity between
predictions and the true outcome distribution. Other fairness desiderata concern disparity in pre-
diction between subpopulations on the basis of a sensitive attribute. For simplicity, we will imagine
individuals are partitioned into two subpopulations A,B ⊆ X ; we will overload notation and use
{A,B} to denote the names of the attributes as well. We let A : X → {A,B} map individuals to
their associated attribute. The most basic notion of parity is demographic parity (also sometimes
called statistical parity in the literature), which states that the selection rate of individuals should
be independent of the sensitive attribute.
Definition (Demographic parity [DHP+12]). A selection rule f : X → {0, 1} satisfies demographic
parity if
Pr
x∼X
[
f(x) = 1
∣∣ A(x) = A] = Pr
x∼X
[
f(x) = 1
∣∣ A(x) = B] .
One critique of demographic parity is that the notion does not take into account the actual qualifi-
cations of groups (i.e. no dependence on y). Another popular parity-based notion, called equalized
opportunity, addresses this criticism by enforcing parity of false negative rates across groups.
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Definition (Equalized opportunity [HPS16]). A selection rule f : X → {0, 1} satisfies equalized
opportunity if
Pr
x,y∼D
[
f(x) = 0
∣∣ y = 1, A(x) = A] = Pr
x,y∼D
[
f(x) = 0
∣∣ y = 1, A(x) = B]
In addition to these fairness concepts, the following properties of a selection rule will be useful to
track. Specifically, we define the true positive rate (TPR), false positive rate (FPR), and positive
predictive value (PPV).
TPR(f) = Pr
x,y∼D
[
f(x) = 1
∣∣ y = 1]
FPR(f) = Pr
x,y∼D
[
f(x) = 1
∣∣ y = 0]
PPV(f) = Pr
x,y∼D
[
y = 1
∣∣ f(x) = 1]
3 Measuring information in binary prediction
In this section, we give a self-contained exposition of a formal notion of information content in
calibrated predictors. These notions have been studied extensively in the forecasting literature
(see [GBR07,GR07] and references therein), but are less common in the literature on computational
and statistical learning theory. Our notion of information content can be derived from the Brier
scoring rule [Bri50].
In the context of binary prediction, a natural way to measure the “informativeness” of a predictor is
by the uncertainty in an individual’s outcome given their score. We quantify this uncertainty using
variance.2 For p ∈ [0, 1], the variance of a Bernoulli random variable with expected value p is given
as Var(Ber(p)) = p · (1−p). Note that variance is a strictly concave function in p and is maximized
at p = 1/2 and minimized p ∈ {0, 1}; that is, a Bernoulli trial with p = 1/2 is maximally uncertain
whereas a trial with p = 0 or p = 1 is perfectly certain. Consider a random draw x, y ∼ D. If z is a
calibrated predictor, then given x and z(x), the conditional distribution over y follows a Bernoulli
distribution with expectation z(x). This observation suggests the following defintion.
Definition (Information content). Suppose for S ⊆ X , z : X → [0, 1] is calibrated on S. The
information content of z on S is given as
IS(z) = 1− 4 · E
x∼S
[z(x)(1− z(x))] .
For a calibrated z, we use I(z) = IX (z) to denote the “information content of z”. The factor 4
in the definition of information content acts as a normalization factor such that I(z) ∈ [0, 1]. At
the extremes, a perfectly informative predictor has information content 1, whereas a calibrated
predictor that always outputs 1/2 has 0 information.
2Alternatively, we could measure uncertainty through Shannon entropy (in fact, any function that admits a
Bregman divergence). The generality of the approach is made clear in [GR07]. In Appendix A, we show that notions
of information that arise from Shannon entropy are effectively interchangeable with those that arise from variance.
We elect to work with variance in the main body primarily because it simplifies the analysis in Section 5.
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This formulation of information content as uncertainty in a binary outcome is intuitive in the context
of binary classification. In some settings, however, it may be more instructive to reason about risk
score distributions directly. A conceptually different approach to measuring informativeness of
a risk score distribution might track the uncertainty in the true (Bayes optimal) risk, given the
predicted risk score.
Consider a random variable P ∗z(x)=v that takes value p
∗(x) for x sampled from the individuals
with score z(x) = v; that is, P ∗z(x)=v equals the true risk for an individual sampled amongst those
receiving predicted risk score v. Again, we could measure the uncertainty in this random variable
by tracking its variance given z(x) = v; the higher the variance, the less information the risk score
distribution Rz provides about the true risk score distribution Rp∗ . Recall, for a predictor z that
is calibrated on S ⊆ X and score v ∈ [0, 1], we let Sz(x)=v = {x ∈ S : z(x) = v}. Consider the
variance in P ∗v given as
Var
[
P ∗z(x)=v
]
= Var
x∼Sz(x)=v
[p∗(x)]
= E
x∼Sz(x)=v
[
(p∗(x)− v)2
]
.
We define the information loss by taking an expectation of this conditional variance over the score
distribution induced by z.
Definition (Information loss). For S ⊆ X , suppose a predictor z : X → [0, 1] is calibrated on S.
The information loss of z on S is given as
LS(p
∗; z) = 4 · E
v∼RzS
x∼Sz(x)=v
[
(p∗(x)− v)2
]
Again, the factor 4 is simply to normalize the information loss into the range L(p∗; z) ∈ [0, 1]. This
loss is maximized when p∗ is a 50:50 mix of {0, 1} but z always predicts 1/2; the information loss
is minimized for z = p∗. We observe that this notion of information loss is actually proportional to
the expected squared error of z with respect to p∗; that is,
E
v∼RzS
x∼Sz(x)=v
[
(p∗(x)− v)2
]
=
∑
v∈supp(z)
RzS(v) · E
x∼Sz(x)=v
[
(p∗(x)− v)2
]
= E
x∼S
[
(p∗(x)− z(x))2
]
Thus, for calibrated predictors, we can interpret the familiar squared loss between a predictor and
the Bayes optimal predictor as a notion of information loss.
Connecting information content and information loss. As we defined them, information
content and information loss seem like conceptually different ways to measure uncertainty in a
predictor. Here, we show that they actually capture the same notion. In particular, we can express
information loss of z as the difference in information content of p∗ and that of z.
Proposition 3.1. Let p∗ : X → [0, 1] denote the Bayes optimal predictor. Suppose for S ⊆ X ,
z : X → [0, 1] is calibrated on S. Then
LS(p
∗; z) = IS(p∗)− IS(z).
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Proof. The proof follows by expanding the information loss and rearranging so that, assuming z
is calibrated, terms cancel. As notational shorthand, let Sv = Sz(x)=v and let p¯ = Ex∼S [p∗(x)] =
Ex∼S [z(x)]. Thus, we can rewrite the information loss LS(p∗; z) as follows.
4 · E
x∼S
[
(p∗(x)− z(x))2
]
= 4 · E
x∼S
[
p∗(x)2 + z(x)2 − 2p∗(x) · z(x)]
= 4 ·
∑
v∈supp(z)
RzS(v) ·
(
E
x∼Sv
[
p∗(x)2
]
+ v2 − 2 E
x∼Sv
[p∗(x)] · v
)
= 4 ·
∑
v∈supp(z)
RzS(v) · E
x∼Sv
[
p∗(x)2 − v2] (1)
= 4 · E
x∼S
[
p∗(x)2 − z(x)2]
=
(
1− 4 · E
x∼S
[
p¯− p∗(x)2])− (1− 4 · E
x∼S
[
p¯− z(x)2])
= IS(p
∗)− IS(z)
where (1) follows because Ex∼Sv [p∗(x)] = v under calibration.
Because the information loss is a nonnegative quantity, Proposition 3.1 also formalizes the inutition
that the Bayes optimal predictor is the most informative predictor; for z 6= p∗, I(z) < I(p∗) ≤
1. Ideally, in order to evaluate the information disparity across groups, we would compare the
information lost from p∗ to z across A and B. But because the definition of information loss
depends on the true score distribution p∗, in general, it’s impossible to directly compare the loss.
Still, if we believe that p∗(x) is similarly distributed across x ∼ A and x ∼ B, then measuring the
information contents IA(z) and IB(z) – properties of the observed risk scores – allows us to directly
compare the loss.
3.1 Incorporating information via refinements
We have motivated the study of informativeness in prediction with the intuition that as information
content improves, so too will the resulting fairness and utility of the decisions derived from the
predictor. Without further assumptions, however, this line of reasoning turns out to be overly-
optimistic. For instance, consider a setting where the expected utility of lending to individuals is
positive if z(x) > τ for some fixed threshold τ (and negative otherwise). In this case, information
about individuals whose p∗(x) is significantly below τ is not especially useful. Figure 1 gives
an example of two predictors, each calibrated to the same p∗(x), where I(z′) > I(z), but z is
preferable. At a high-level, the example exploits the fact that information content I(z) is a global
property of z, whereas the quantities that affect the utility and fairness directly, like PPV or
TPR are conditional properties. Even if I(z′) > I(z), it could be that z′ has lost information
about an important subpopulation compared to z, compensating with lots of information about
the unqualified individuals.
Still, we would like to characterize ways in which more information is definitively “better.” Intu-
itively, more information is better when we don’t have to give up on the information in the current
predictor, but rather refine the information contained in the predictions further. The following
definition, equivalent to a notion proposed in [DF81], formalizes this idea.
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Figure 1: Comparing information content directly is insufficient to compare predictors’ utility. Two predictors
z, z′ : X → [0, 1] are each calibrated to p∗ : X → {0, 1} with E [p∗(x)] = 1/2. In z, Pr[z(x) = 1/3] = 3/5 and
Pr[z(x) = 3/4] = 2/5; in z′, Pr[z(x) = 0] = 1/4 and Pr[z(x) = 2/3] = 3/4. I(z′) > I(z), but z achieves better utility
than z′ whenever 2/3 < τ < 3/4.
Definition (Refinement). For S ⊆ X , suppose z, z′ : X → [0, 1] are calibrated on S. z′ is a
refinement of z on S if for all v ∈ supp(z),
E
x∼Sz(x)=v
[
z′(x)
]
= v.
That is, we say that z′ refines z if z′ maintains the same expectation over the level sets Sz(x)=v. To
understand why this property makes sense in the context of maintaining information from z to z′,
suppose the property was violated: that is, there is some v ∈ supp(z) such that Ex∼Sz(x)=v [z′(x)] 6=
v. This disagreement provides evidence that z has some consistency with the true risk that z′ is
lacking; because z is calibrated, Ex∼Sz(x)=v [z(x)] = v = Ex∼Sz(x)=v [p
∗(x)]. In other words, even if
z′ has greater information content, it may not be consistent with the content of z.
Another useful perspective on refinements is through measuring the information on each of the sets
Sz(x)=v. Restricted to Sz(x)=v, z has minimal information content – its predictions are constant –
whereas z′ may vary. Because z′ is calibrated and maintains the expectation over Sz(x)=v, we can
conclude that ISz(x)=v(z) ≤ ISz(x)=v(z′) for each of the partitions.
This perspective highlights the importance of requiring calibration in the definition of refinements.
Indeed, because a refinement is a calibrated predictor, refinements cannot make arbitrary distinc-
tions in predictions, so any additional distinctions on the level sets of the original predictor must
represent true variability in p∗. We draw attention to the similarity between the definition of a
refinement and the definition of calibration. In particular, if z′ is a refinement of z, then z is not
only calibrated with respect to p∗, but also with respect to z′; stated differently, p∗ is a refinement
of every calibrated predictor. Indeed, one way to interpret a refinement is as a “candidate” Bayes
optimal predictor. Carrying this intuition through, we note that the only property of p∗ we used in
the proof of Proposition 3.1 is that it is a refinement of a calibrated z. Thus, we can immediately
restate the proposition in terms of generic refinements.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose for S ⊆ X , z, z′ : X → [0, 1] are calibrated on S. If z′ refines z on S,
then LS(z
′; z) = IS(z′)− IS(z).
This characterization further illustrates the notion that a refinement z′ could plausibly be the true
risk given the information in the current predictions z. In particular, because LS(z
′; z) > 0, we get
IS(z
′) > IS(z) for any refinement z′ 6= z.
In the context of fair prediction, we want to ensure that the information content on specific protected
subpopulations does not decrease. Indeed, in this case, it may be important to ensure that the
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r(B1) = 1.0;  p(B1) = 1/18
r(B0) = 0.0;  p(B0) = 1/18
r(Bp) = 6/7;  p(Bp) = 7/18
r(Bn) = 1/7;  p(Bn) = 7/18
r(Ap) = 3/4;  p(Ap) = 1/18
r(An) = 1/4;  p(An) = 1/18
Figure 2: Per-group refinement is necessary to maintain information for each group. Let A = An ∪ Ap and
B = Bn ∪ Bp ∪ B0 ∪ B1 where r(S) = Ex∼S [p∗(x)] and p(S) = Prx∼X [x ∈ S]. The two predictors z, z′ : X → [0, 1]
are each calibrated on A and B. Note that z′ refines z overall, but has lost all information about A.
predictions are refined, not just overall, but also on the sensitive subpopulations. In Figure 2, we
illustrate this point by showing two predictors z, z′ : X → [0, 1] that are each calibrated on two
subpopulations A,B ⊆ X ; z′ refines z on X overall, but z′ loses information about the subpopulation
A. This negative example highlights the importance of incorporating all the information available
(e.g. group membership), not only at the time of decision-making, but also along the way when
developing predictors; it serves as yet another rebuke of the approach of “fairness through blindness”
[DHP+12].
4 The value of information in fair prediction
In this section, we argue that reasoning about the information content of calibrated predictors
provides a lens into understanding how to improve the utility and fairness of predictors, even when
the eventual fairness desideratum is based on parity. We discuss a prediction setting based on
that of [LDR+18] where a lender selects individuals to give loans from a pool of applicants. While
we use the language of predicting creditworthiness, the setup is generic and can be applied to
diverse prediction tasks. [LDR+18] introduced a notion of “delayed impact” of selection policies,
which models the potential negative impact on communities of enforcing parity-based fairness as
a constraint. We revisit the question of delayed impact as part of a broader investigation of the
role of information in fair prediction. We begin with an overview of the prediction setup. Then, we
prove our main result: refining the underlying predictions used to choose a selection policy results
in an improvement in utility, parity, or impact (or a combination of the three).
4.1 Fair prediction setup
When deciding how to select qualified individuals, the lender’s goal is to maximize some expected
utility. Specifically, the utility function u : [0, 1] → [−1, 1] specifies the lender’s expected utility
from an individual based on their score and a fixed threshold3 τu ∈ [0, 1] as given in (2). When
considering delayed impact, we will measure the expected impact per subpopulation. The impact
function ` : [0, 1] → [−1, 1] specifies the expected benefit to an individual from receiving a loan
based on their score and a fixed threshold τ` also given in (2).
u(p) = p− τu `(p) = p− τ` (2)
3Assuming such an affine utility function is equivalent to assuming that the lender receives u+ from repayments,
u− from defaults, and 0 from individuals that do not receive loans. In this case, the expected utility for score p is
pu+ + (1− p)u− = cu · u(p) for some constant cu. A similar rationale applies to the individuals’ impact function.
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[LDR+18] models risk-aversion of the lender by assuming that τu > τ`; that is, by choosing
accepting individuals with z(x) ∈ (τ`, τu), the impact on subpopulations may improve beyond the
lender’s utility-maximizing policy.
In this setup, we allow the lender to pick a (randomized) group-sensitive selection policy f :
[0, 1]× {A,B} → [0, 1] that selects individuals on the basis of a predicted score and their sensitive
attribute. That is, the selection policy makes decisions about individuals via their score according
to some calibrated predictor z : X → [0, 1] and their sensitive attribute A : X → {A,B}; for every
individual x ∈ X , the probability that x is selected is given as f(z(x),A(x)).
We will restrict our attention to threshold policies; that is, for sensitive attribute A (resp., B),
there is some τA ∈ [0, 1], such that f(v,A) is given as f(v,A) = 1 if v > τA, f(v,A) = 0 if v < τA
and f(v,A) = pA for v = τA, where pA ∈ [0, 1] is a probability used to randomly break ties on the
threshold. The motivation for focusing on threshold policies is their intuitiveness, widespread use,
computational efficiency4. The restriction to threshold policies is justified formally in [LDR+18] by
the fact that the optimal decision rule in our setting can be specified as a threshold policy under
both demographic parity and equalized opportunity.
Given this setup, we can write the expected utility U z(f) of a policy f based on a calibrated
predictor z, that is calibrated on both subpopulations, A and B, as follows.
U z(f) =
∑
S∈{A,B}
Pr
x∼X
[x ∈ S] ·
 ∑
v∈supp(z)
RzS(v) · f(v, S) · u(v)
 (3)
Recall, RzS(v) = Prx∼S [z(x) = v].
Similarly, the expected impact over the subpopulations S ∈ {A,B} are given as
ImpzS(f) =
∑
v∈supp(z)
RzS(v) · f(v, S) · `(v) (4)
Often, it may make sense to constrain the net impact to each group as defined in (4) to be positive,
ensuring that the selection policies do not do harm as in [LDR+18].
The following quantities will be of interest to the lender when choosing a selection policy f as a
function of z. First, the lender’s overall utility U(f) is given as in (3). In the name of fairness, the
lender may also be concerned about the disparity of a number of quantities. We will show below
that these quantities can be written as a linear function of the selection rule. In particular, for
S ∈ {A,B} demographic parity, which serve as our running example, compares the selection rates
βS = Prx∼S [x selected],
βzS(f) =
∑
v∈supp(z)
RzS(v) · f(v, S). (5)
We may also be concerned about comparing the true positive rates (equalized opportunity) and
false positive rates. Recall, TPR = Pr[x selected
∣∣ y = 1] and FPR = Pr[x selected ∣∣ y = 0]; in
4Indeed, without the restriction to threshold policies, many of the information-theoretic arguments become easier
at the expense of computational cost. As z′ is a refinement of z, we can always simulate decisions derived from z
given z′, but in general, we cannot do this efficiently.
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this context, we can rewrite these quantities as follows.
TPRzS(f) =
1
rS
·
∑
v∈supp(z)
RzS(v) · f(v, S) · v (6)
FPRzS(f) =
1
1− rS ·
∑
v∈supp(z)
RzS(v) · f(v, S) · (1− v), (7)
where rS represents the base rate of the subpopulation S; that is, rS = Pr(x,y)∼DS [y = 1]. Another
quantity we will track is the positive predictive value, PPV = Pr[y = 1
∣∣ x selected].
PPVzS(f) =
1
βzS(f)
·
 ∑
v∈supp(z)
RzS(v) · f(v, S) · v
 (8)
Note that PPVzS(f) is not a linear function of f(v, S) values, but as we never use positive predictive
values directly in the optimizations for choosing a selection policy (or in a parity-based fairness
definition), the optimizations are still a linear program. For notational convenience, we may drop
the superscript of these quantities when z is clear from the context.
4.2 Refinements in the service of fair prediction
Note that all of the quantities described in Section 4.1 can be written as linear functions of f(v, S).
Given a fixed predictor z : X → [0, 1], we can expand the quantities of interest; in particular, we
note that the linear functions over f(v, S) can be rewritten as linear functions over z(x), where
the quantities depend on x only through the predictor z. In this section, we show how refining
the predictor used for determining the selection rule can improve the utility, parity, and impact of
the optimal selection rule. By the observations above, we can formulate a generic policy-selection
problem as a linear program where z controls many coefficients in the program. When we refine
z, we show that the value of the program increases. Recalling that different contexts may call
for different notions of fairness, we consider a number of different linear programs the lender (or
regulator) might choose to optimize. At a high-level, the lender can choose to maximize utility,
minimize disparity, or maximize positive impact on groups, while also maintaining some guarantees
over the other quantities.
We will consider selection policies given a fixed predictor z : X → [0, 1]. Note that the parity-based
fairness desiderata we consider are of the form hzA(f) = h
z
B(f) for some h ∈ {β,TPR,FPR}; rather
than requiring equality, we will consider the disparity |hzA(f)− hzB(f)| and in some cases, constrain
it to be less than some constant ε. We also use ti, tu to denote lower bounds on the desired impact
and utility, respectively. For simplicity’s sake, we assume that B is the “protected” group, so we
only enforce the positive impact constraint for this group; more generally, we could include an
impact constraint for each group. Formally, we consider the following constrained optimizations.
Optimization 1 Optimization 2 Optimization 3
maxf U
z(f) minf |hzA(f)− hzB(f)| maxf ImpzB(f)
s.t. ImpzB(f) ≥ ti s.t. ImpzB(f) ≥ ti s.t. U z(f) ≥ tu
|hzA(f)− hzB(f)| ≤ ε U z(f) ≥ tu |hzA(f)− hzB(f)| ≤ 
(Utility Maximization) (Disparity minimization) (Impact Maximization)
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Lemma 4.1. Let h ∈ {β,TPR,FPR}. Given a calibrated predictor z : X → [0, 1], Optimization
1,2, and 3 are linear programs in the variables f(v, S) for v ∈ supp(z) and S ∈ {A,B}. Further,
for each program, there is an optimal solution f∗ that is a threshold policy.
We sketch the proof of the lemma. The fact that the optimizations are linear programs follows
immediately from the observations that each quantity of interest is a linear function in f(v, S). The
proof that there is a threshold policy f∗ that achieves the optimal value in each program is similar
to the proof of Theorem 4.2 given below. Consider an arbitrary (non-threshold) selection policy
f0; let hS,0 = hS(f0). The key observation is that for the fixed value of hS,0, there is some other
threshold policy f where hzS(f) = hS,0 and U
z(f) ≥ U(f0) and ImpzS(f) ≥ ImpS(f0). Leveraging
this observation, given any non-threshold optimal selection policy, we can construct a threshold
policy, which is also optimal.
We remark that our analysis applies even if considering the more general linear maximization:
Optimization 4
maxf λU · U z(f) + λI · ImpzB(f)− λβ · |hzA(f)− hzB(f)|
for any fixed λU , λI , λβ ≥ 0.5 In other words, the arguments hold no matter the relative weighting
of the value of utility, disparity, and impact.
Improving the cost of fairness. We argue that in all of these optimizations, increasing infor-
mation through refinements of the current predictor on both the subpopulations A and B improves
this value of the program. We emphasize that this conclusion is true for all of the notions of
parity-based fairness we mentioned above. Thus, independent of the exact formulation of fair selec-
tion that policy-makers deem appropriate, information content is a key factor in determining the
properties of the resulting selection rule. We formalize this statement in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2. Let z, z′ : X → [0, 1] be two predictors that are calibrated on disjoint subpopulations
A,B ⊆ X . For any of the Optimization 1, 2, 3, 4 and their corresponding fixed parameters, let
OPT(z) denote their optimal value under predictor z. If z′ refines z on A and B, then OPT(z′) ≥
OPT(z) for Optimization 1, 3, 4 and OPT(z′) ≤ OPT(z) for Optimization 2.
One way to understand Theorem 4.2 is through a “cost of fairness” analysis. Focusing on the utility
maximization setting, let U∗ be the maximum unconstrained utility achievable by the lender given
the optimal predictions p∗. Let OPT(z) be the optimal value of Optimization 1 using predictions
z; that is, the best utility a lender can achieve under a parity-based fairness constraint (ε = 0) and
positive impact constraint (ti = 0). If we take the cost of fairness to be the difference between these
optimal utilities, U∗ −OPT(z), then Theorem 4.2 says that by refining z to z′, the cost of fairness
decreases with increasing informativeness; that is, U∗ − OPT(z) ≥ U∗ − OPT(z′). This corollary
of Theorem 4.2 corroborates the idea that in some cases the high perceived cost associated with
requiring fairness might actually be due to the low informativeness of the predictions in minority
5In particular, each of Optimizations 1, 2, and 3 can be expressed as an instance of Optimization 4 by choosing
λU , λI , λβ to be the optimal dual multipliers for each program. We note that the dual formulation actually gives
an alternate way to derive results from [LDR+18]. Their main result can be restated as saying that there exist
distributions of scores such that the dual multiplier on the positive impact constraint in Optimization 1 is positve;
that is, without this constraint, the utility-maximizing policy will do negative impact to group B.
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populations. No matter what the true p∗ is, this cost will decrease as we increase information
content by refining subpopulations.
For S ∈ {A,B}, we use TPRzS(β) to denote the true positive rate of the threshold policy with
selection rate β for the subpopulation S while using the predictor z6. Similarly, PPVzS(β), FPR
z
S(β)
are defined. The following lemma, which plays a key role in each proof, shows that refinements
broadly improve selection policies across these three statistics of interest.
Lemma 4.3. If z′ is a refinement of z on subpopulations A and B, then for S ∈ {A,B}, for all
β ∈ [0, 1],
TPRz
′
S (β) ≥ TPRzS(β), FPRz
′
S (β) ≤ FPRzS(β), PPVz
′
S (β) ≥ PPVzS(β).
In particular, the proof of Theorem 4.2 crucially uses the fact that the positive predictive values,
true positive rates, and false positive rates improve for all selection rates. Leveraging properties
of refinements, the improvement across all selection rates guarantees improvement for any fixed
objective. As we’ll see, the proof actually tells us more: for any selection policy using the predictor
z, there exists a threshold selection policy that uses the refined predictor z′ and simultaneously has
utility, disparity, and impact that are no worse than under z. In this sense, increasing informative-
ness of predictors through refinements is an effective strategy for improving selection rules across
a wide array of criteria. Still, we emphasize the importance of identifying fairness desiderata and
specifying them clearly when optimizing for a selection rule.
For instance, suppose the selection rule is selected by constrained utility maximization with a
predictor z and with a refined predictor z′. It is possible that the optimal selection policy under
the refinement z′ will have a lower quantitative impact than the optimal policy under the original
predictor z (while still satisfying the impact constraint). If maintaining the impact above a certain
threshold is desired, then this should be specified clearly in the optimization used for determining
the selection rule. We defer further discussion of these issues to Section 6.
Proofs. Next, we prove Lemma 4.3 and Theorem 4.2.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. Note that for a fixed selection rate β, PPV is maximized by picking the
top-most β fraction of the individuals ranked according to p∗, i.e. a threshold policy that selects a
β-fraction of the individuals using the Bayes optimal predictor p∗. Similarly, for a fixed selection
rate, the TPR and FPR values are also optimized under a threshold selection policy that uses the
Bayes optimal predictor p∗.
Recall, we can interpret a refinement as a “candidate” Bayes optimal predictor. In particular,
because z′ refines z over A and B, we know that z is calibrated not only with respect to the true
Bayes optimal predictor p∗, but also with respect to the refinement z′ on both subpopulations.
Imagining a world in which z′ is the Bayes optimal predictor, the PPV, TPR, and FPR must be
no worse under a threshold policy derived from z′ compared to that of z by the initial observation.
Thus, the lemma follows. 
Using Lemma 4.3, we are ready to prove Theorem 4.2.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Let f be any threshold selection policy under the predictor z. Using
f , we will construct a selection policy f ′ that uses the refined score distribution z′ such that
6Given a predictor, there is a bijection between selection rates and threshold policies.
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where U z
′
(f ′) ≥ U z(f), Impz′B(f ′) ≥ ImpzB(f), and hz
′
A(f
′) = hzA(f) and h
z′
B(f
′) = hzB(f). Here,
h ∈ {β,TPR,FPR} specifies the parity-based fairness definition being used. Thus, taking f to be
the optimal solution to any of the Optimizations 1, 2, 3, or 4, we see that f ′ is a feasible solution
to the same optimization and has the same or a better objective value compared to f . Therefore,
after optimization, objective values can only get better.
In words, we are saying that refined predictors allow us to get better utility and impact as the
original predictor while keeping the parity values the same (for e.g., while keeping the selection
rates the same in both subpopulations).
We separately construct f ′ for each fairness definition (h) as follows:
1. (Demographic Parity) h = β:
For S ∈ {A,B}, let βS = βzS(f) be the selection rate of f in the population S. Let f ′
be the threshold policy that uses the predictor z′ and achieves selection rates βA and βB
in the subpopulations A and B, respectively. By Lemma 4.3, PPVz
′
S (βS) ≥ PPVzS(βS) for
S ∈ {A,B}. The utility of the policy f ′ can be written as
U(f ′) =
∑
S∈{A,B}
Pr
x∼X
[x ∈ S] ·
 ∑
v∈supp(z′)
Rz′S (v) · f ′(v, S) · v −
∑
v∈supp(z′)
Rz′S (v) · f ′(v, S) · τu

=
∑
S∈{A,B}
Pr
x∼X
[x ∈ S] ·
(
βS · (PPVz′S (βS)− τu)
)
≥
∑
S∈{A,B}
Pr
x∼X
[x ∈ S] · (βS · (PPVzS(βS)− τu))
= U(f)
Similarly, we can show that the impact on the subpopulation B under f ′ is at least as good
as under f .
2. (Equalized Opportunity) h = TPR:
Let (βA, βB) be the selection rates of policy f on the subpopulations A and B. We know
that TPRz
′
S (βS) ≥ TPRzS(βS) (S ∈ {A,B}) through Lemma 4.3. Let f ′ be the threshold
selection policy corresponding to a selection rates of β′S , (S ∈ {A,B}) such that TPRz
′
S (β
′
S) =
TPRzS(βS) (≤ TPRz
′
S (βS)). As the true positive rates increase with increasing selection rate,
β′S ≤ βS . The utility of the policy f ′ can be written as
U(f ′) =
∑
S∈{A,B}
Pr
x∼X
[x ∈ S] ·
 ∑
v∈supp(z′)
Rz′S (v) · f ′(v, S) · v −
∑
v∈supp(z′)
Rz′S (v) · f ′(v, S) · τu

=
∑
S∈{A,B}
Pr
x∼X
[x ∈ S] ·
(
rS · TPRz′S (β′S)− β′S · τu
)
≥
∑
S∈{A,B}
Pr
x∼X
[x ∈ S] · (rS · TPRzS(βS)− βS · τu)
= U(f)
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Similarly, we can show that the impact on the subpopulation B under f ′ is at least as good
as under f .
3. (Equalized False Positive Rate) h = FPR.
Let (βA, βB) be the selection rates of policy f on the subpopulations A and B. We know
that FPRz
′
S (βS) ≤ FPRzS(βS) (S ∈ {A,B}) through Lemma 4.3. Let f ′ be the threshold
selection policy corresponding to a selection rates of β′S , (S ∈ {A,B}) such that FPRz
′
S (β
′
S) =
FPRzS(βS) (≥ FPRz
′
S (βS)). As the false postive rates increase with increasing selection rate,
β′S ≥ βS . The utility of the policy f ′ can be written as
U(f ′) =
∑
S∈{A,B}
Pr
x∼X
[x ∈ S] ·
 ∑
v∈supp(z′)
Rz′S (v) · f ′(v, S) · v −
∑
v∈supp(z′)
Rz′S (v) · f ′(v, S) · τu

=
∑
S∈{A,B}
Pr
x∼X
[x ∈ S] ·
(
β′S − (1− rS) · FPRz
′
S (β
′
S)− β′S · τu
)
=
∑
S∈{A,B}
Pr
x∼X
[x ∈ S] ·
(
β′S · (1− τu)− (1− rS) · FPRz
′
S (β
′
S)
)
≥
∑
S∈{A,B}
Pr
x∼X
[x ∈ S] · (βS · (1− τu)− (1− rS) · FPRzS(βS))
= U(f)
Similarly, we can show that the impact on the subpopulation B under f ′ is at least as good
as under f .
This completes the proof of the theorem. 
5 A mechanism for refining predictors
In this section, we outline a mechanism for obtaining refinements of predictors. We start by
describing an algorithm, merge, which given two calibrated predictors, produces a new refined
predictor that incorporates the information from both predictors (in a sense we make formal). For
notational convenience, we describe how to refine a predictor over X . The arguments here extend
easily to refining over a partition of X by refining each part separately. We discuss the generality of
the approach at the end of the section and elaborate on the possibility of refinements on overlapping
subpopulations briefly in Section 6.
Given a predictor z, we can evaluate the information content I(z) directly; estimating the informa-
tion loss L(p∗; z), however, is generally impossible. Indeed, without assumptions on the structure
of p∗ or the ability to sample every individual’s outcome repeatedly (and independently), we cannot
reason about information-theoretic quantities like I(p∗). Still, supposing that the information loss
of z is sufficiently large, we would like to be able to certify this fact and ideally, bring the loss down.
The most obvious way to demonstrate that a predictor z can be refined would be to exhibit some
calibrated q : X → [0, 1] such that I(q) > I(z). That said, expecting that we could obtain such a
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q seems to sidestep the question of how to update a predictor to improve its information content.
Even if we were able to obtain some q where I(q) > I(z), it is not clear that q would be a “better”
predictor. In particular, q might contain different information than z; recall that such examples
motivated the definition of a refinement in the first place. Still, intuitively, if q is not a refinement
of z and contains very different information than z, then q should be useful in identifying ways to
improve the informativeness of z. Further, this intuition does not seem to rely on the fact that
I(q) > I(z); as long as q contains information that isn’t “known” to z, then incorporating the
information into z should reduce the information loss.
To formalize this line of reasoning, first, we need to make precise what we mean when we say that
q is far from refining z. Recalling the definition of a refinement, consider the logical negation of
the statement that “q refines z.”
¬
(
∀v ∈ supp(z) : E
x∼Xz(x)=v
[q(x)] = v
)
⇐⇒ ∃v ∈ supp(z) : E
x∼Xz(x)=v
[q(x)] 6= v.
Extending this logical formulation, we define the following divergence to capture quantitatively how
far q is from refining z.
Definition (Refinement distance). Let q, z : X → [0, 1] be calibrated predictors. The refinement
distance from z to q is given as
DR(z; q) =
∑
v∈supp(z)
Rz(v) ·
∣∣∣∣ Ex∼Xz(x)=v [q(x)]− v
∣∣∣∣ .
Note that DR(z; q) is not symmetric; in particular, if q refines z and contains more information
I(q) > I(z), then DR(z; q) = 0, but DR(q; z) > 0. Intuitively, the refinement distance averages
the refinement “disagreements” over all values in the support. We show that, under calibration,
these disagreements can be reconciled to improve the overall information content. With the notion
of refinement distance in place, we can state the main algorithmic result – a simple algorithm for
aggregating the information of multiple calibrated predictors into a single calibrated predictor.
Theorem 5.1. Given two calibrated predictors q, z : X → [0, 1], Algorithm 1 produces a new
calibrated predictor ρ : X → [0, 1] such that ρ is a refinement of both z and q. Further, I(ρ) >
max
{
I(z) + 4 ·DR(q; z)2, I(q) + 4 ·DR(z; q)2
}
.
We state the theorem generally, making no assumptions about DR(q; z) or DR(z; q). In particular,
as we alluded to earlier, if q already refines z, then DR(z; q) = 0, so there will be no information
gain. Algorithm 1, which we refer to as merge, describes the procedure. We describe the algorithm
in the statistical query model, where we assume query access to aggregate statistics about p∗(x). At
the end of the section, we discuss the sample complexity needed to answer such statistical queries
accurately. The merge algorithm builds a new calibrated predictor ρ from q and z by considering
the set of individuals who receive q(x) = u and z(x) = v for each u ∈ supp(q) and v ∈ supp(z).
For each of these sets, the merged predictor adjusts the prediction to have the correct expectation.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 follows from a standard potential function analysis; further, the sample
complexity needed to answer the statistical queries accurately is bounded.
We break the proof of Theorem 5.1 into two lemmas. First, note that the merge procedure is
symmetric with respect to q and z. Thus, any statements about the output ρ in terms of one of
the inputs z will also be true with respect to the input q.
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Algorithm 1: merge(z,q)
Given: z, q : X → [0, 1] calibrated predictors
Output: ρ : X → [0, 1] a refinement of z and q
• Let Z = {Xz(x)=v : v ∈ supp(z)}
• Let Q = {Xq(x)=u : u ∈ supp(q)}
• For Zv ∈ Z and Qu ∈ Q:
– Xvu = Zv ∩Qu
– ρ(x)← E
x∼Xvu
[p∗(x)]
Lemma 5.2. Let ρ be the output of Algorithm 1 on two calibrated predictors z, q : X → [0, 1] as
input. ρ is a refinement of z.
Proof. We use the notation established in Algorithm 1. In particular, we refer to the conditional
score distribution RqZv where R
q
Zv
(u) = Prx∼X
[
q(x) = u
∣∣ z(x) = v]. Consider the expectation of
ρ over the level sets of z, {Zv : v ∈ supp(z)}.
E
x∼Zv
[ρ(x)] =
∑
u∈supp(q)
RqZv(u) · Ex∼Xvu [ρ(x)]
=
∑
u∈supp(q)
RqZv(u) · Ex∼Xvu
[
E
x∼Xvu
[p∗(x)]
]
(9)
=
∑
u∈supp(q)
RqZv(u) · Ex∼Zv
[
p∗(x)
∣∣ q(x) = u] (10)
= E
x∼Zv
[p∗(x)]
where (9) follows by the assignment rule of ρ(x) for x ∈ Xvu; and (10) follows from exploiting
Xvu = {x ∈ Zv : q(x) = u}. By the calibration of z, we see the final expression is equal to v. This
argument is independent of v, so for all v ∈ supp(z), Ex∼Zv [ρ(x)] = v; thus, by definition, ρ refines
z.
The next lemma shows that the information of ρ increases based on the refinement distance. Note
that in combination Lemma 5.2 and Lemma 5.3 prove Theorem 5.1.
Lemma 5.3. Let ρ be the output of Algorithm 1 on two calibrated predictors z, q : X → [0, 1] as
input. Then,
I(ρ) ≥ I(z) + 4 ·DR(q; z)2.
Proof. We can lower bound the resulting information content of ρ by reasoning about the difference
I(ρ) − I(z). Note that by Lemma 5.2, ρ is a refinement of z; further, by Proposition 3.2, we can
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express I(ρ) − I(z) as L(ρ; z). Expanding the information loss, we can lower bound the gain in
information, which shows the lemma.
1
4
· L(ρ; z) = E
x∼X
[
(ρ(x)− z(x))2]
=
∑
u∈supp(q)
Rq(u) · E
x∼Qu
[
(z(x)− ρ(x))2
]
≥
∑
u∈supp(q)
Rq(u) ·
(
E
x∼Qu
[z(x)− ρ(x)]
)2
(11)
=
∑
u∈supp(q)
Rq(u) ·
(
E
x∼Qu
[z(x)]− u
)2
(12)
≥
 ∑
u∈supp(q)
Rq(u) ·
∣∣∣∣ Ex∼Qu [z(x)]− u
∣∣∣∣
2 (13)
≥ DR(q; z)2 (14)
where (11) follows by Jensen’s Inequality; (12) notes that Ex∼Qu [ρ(x)] = u because q is calibrated
and ρ refines q; (13) applies Jensen’s inequality again; and (14) follows by the definition of refinement
distance.
One appealing consequence of Theorem 5.1 is that the number of times a predictor needs to be
significantly updated is bounded. In particular, suppose we are merging two calibrated predictors
q, z; for any η ≥ 0, we’ll say the operation is an η-merge if min {DR(z; q), DR(q; z)} ≥ η. In this
case, the information content of the result predictor will increase by at least Ω(η2) and any given
predictor can be η-merged at most O(1/η2) times. In other words, as long as the information being
combined is not too similar, then the number of such merge updates is bounded.
Interpreting the updates. As described, the merge algorithm takes two different calibrated
predictors and combines them into a refinement. In settings where the lender wants to combine
predictions from different sources, this algorithmic model is naturally well-motivated. Still, there
are other settings where the merge algorithm can be applied. One natural way we can specify
new information content is by giving the predictor an additional feature. Specifically, consider
some a boolean feature φ : X → {0, 1}. We define the predictor qφ : X → [0, 1] to be qφ(x) =
Ex′∼X
[
p∗(x′)
∣∣ φ(x′) = φ(x)]. This predictor gives the expected value over the set of individuals
where φ(x) = 1 (resp., φ(x) = 0); thus, the predictor is calibrated. Merging z with qφ incorporates
the information in the boolean feature φ into the predictions of z. In particular, the information
content framework gives us a way to reason about the marginal informativeness of individual
boolean features; the greater the difference between Ex∼φ−1(0)[p∗(x)] and Ex∼φ−1(1)[p∗(x)], the
more informative.
This perspective is particularly salient when we think external regulation of predictors. For ex-
ample, consider some subpopulation S ⊆ X . One way to provide evidence that S is experiencing
discrimination under z would be to demonstrate that merging the predictor qS into z significantly
changes the information content. This could occur because the quality of individuals in S are
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consistently underestimated by z or because the quality of individuals in X \ S are consistently
overestimated.
Implementing the merge from samples. While we presented the merge algorithm assuming
access to a statistical query oracle, in practice, we want to estimate the necessary statistical queries
from data. We assume that the predictions are discretized to precision α; that is, we represent the
interval [0, 1] as [α/2, 3α/2, . . . , 1 − α/2]. We argue that the number of samples needed to obtain
accurate statistics in this model is bounded as follows.
Proposition 5.4. Consider an execution of Algorithm 1 such that minXvu Prx∼X [x ∈ Xvu] ≥ γ.
Then from m ≥ Ω˜
(
log(1/δ)
γα2
)
random samples from D, with probability 1− δ, every statistical query
can be answered with some qvu such that |qvu −Ex∼Xvu [p∗(x)]| < α/2.
Proof. The argument follows by a standard uniform convergence argument. To start, note that
there are at most 1/α2 queries to answer. Suppose we have t random samples (xi, yi) ∼ D condi-
tioned on xi ∈ Xvu for all i ∈ [t]. Let qvu denote the empirical expectation of yi’s on these t samples
over Xvu; that is,
qvu ,
1
t
t∑
i=1
yi.
By Hoeffding’s inequality:
Pr
[ ∣∣∣∣qvu − Ex∼Xvu[y ∣∣ x]
∣∣∣∣ > α] ≤ 2e2tα2 .
If t ≥ Ω
(
log(2/δα2)
α2
)
, then the probability of failure is at most α2δ/2. Union bounding over the
queries, the probability of failure is at most δ/2.
Thus, we need to bound the sample complexity needed to hit each Xvu at least t times. By
assumption, each Xvu has density at least γ. Thus, for each Xvu, the probability that a random
sample from (x, y) ∼ D has x ∈ Xvu is at least γ. If we take Ω(log(2t/δ)/γ) such samples, then
the probability every sample misses Xvu is at most δ/2t. Thus, if we take Ω(t log(2t/δ)/γ) samples,
each Xvu will have at least t samples with probability at least 1− δ/2.
By union bound, the proposition follows.
6 Discussion
In this work, we identify information disparity as a potential source of discrimination in prediction
tasks. We provide an introduction to key concepts of information content and loss, and show how
improving the information content of predictions improves the resulting fairness of the downstream
decisions. In particular, our results show when a lender does not have sufficient statistical or
computational resources to learn a predictor that achieves small squared error across all significant
subpopulations, issues of unfairness may arise due to differential information loss.
The information content of a predictor z can be significantly larger on the majority population S
than the minority T for a number of reasons.
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• Despite optimal predictions, the individuals in S are inherently more predictable than those
in T ; i.e. z ≈ p∗ and IS(p∗) > IT (p∗). If this (controversial) hypothesis is true, there may be
no way to improve the predictions further, and some degree of disparity may be unavoidable.
Note that in general this condition cannot be verified from data. Still, the assumption that
I(z) = I(p∗) can be falsified by finding a way to give more informative predictions.
• Nontrivial information loss has occurred in z on T compared to S; i.e. LS(p∗; z) < LT (p∗; z).
Such information loss could result from purely information theoretic issues (features used for
prediction are not sufficiently expressive in T ), a mix of informational and computational
issues (not enough data from the minority to learn a predictor from a sufficiently rich hy-
pothesis class), or purely computational issues (suboptimal learning in T due to optimization
for S∪T ). Each source of information disparity has a different own solution (collecting better
features, collecting more data, re-training with awareness of the population T , respectively),
but the tools we present for reasoning about information content apply broadly.
As such, improving the information content of predictions may require collecting additional features
or data. Once collected, the merge procedure provides a relatively inexpensive way of incorporating
new information into the predictions while retaining certain “quality” of the selection rule. In
practice, when the sensitive group T is known, it may make sense to simply retrain the prediction
model with awareness of T .
Overlapping subpopulations. The proposed merge algorithm provides a simple and efficient
approach for producing refinements in applications where the sensitive populations are well un-
derstood. Often, as highlighted in [HKRR18, KNRW18, KRR18], the subpopulations in need of
protection may be hard to anticipate. These recent works have studied notions of multi-fairness
that aim to strengthen notions of group fairness by enforcing statistical constraints not just overall,
but on a rich family of subgroups. In particular, [HKRR18] introduces a notion called multicali-
bration, which informally, guarantees calibration across all subpopulations specified by a given set
system C. We observe that the guarantees of multicalibration can be reinterpreted in the language
of refinements: a predictor that is multicalibrated with respect to C is simultaneously a refinement
for all qc : X → [0, 1] where qc(x) = Ex′∼X
[
p∗(x′)
∣∣ c(x′) = c(x)] for every c ∈ C. In this sense, mul-
ticalibration may be an effective approach to improving information across subpopulations, when
the groups that might be experiencing discrimination are unknown or overlapping. An interesting
question is whether some of the analysis in the present work can be applied to understand better
the connections between multicalibration and the work of [KNRW18] which studies the notion of
rich subgroup fairness under demographic parity and equalized opportunity.
Choosing fairness constraints. Understanding precisely the guarantees of the specified fairness
constraints is particularly important for interpreting the results of Section 4. In particular, refining
predictions is guaranteed to improve the value of the stated program. We emphasize the importance
of faithfully translating fairness desiderata into mathematical requirements.
For instance, suppose policy-makers want to increase representation for historically-disenfranchised
populations. An appealing – but misguided – translation of this goal would require demographic
parity; intuitively, if the lender is required to have equalized selection rates across groups, they
might increase the selection rate in the minority to match that of the majority. Still, demographic
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parity only requires parity of selection rates which could also be achieved by reducing the selection
in the majority. Further, refinements under demographic parity constraints, might cause the se-
lection rates in the minority to decrease. By increasing information, we might uncover that fewer
individuals are actually above the tolerable risk than the previous predictions suggested; as such,
fewer individuals might be deemed qualified for a loan.
The framework proposed in Section 4 is compatible with a variety of constraints and objectives,
including explicitly lower bounding the group selection rates. Thus, increasing the selection rate in
a given population can always be achieved by directly constraining the selection rule. An appealing
aspect of the framework is that it allows policy-makers to experiment with constraints and objectives
to understand the downstream effects of their policies, given the current set of predictions. For
instance, policy-makers can evaluate how lower bounding the selection rate in a group will affect
the impact of the policy on this group. Such experimentation with the programs from Section 4
may help to guide future policy decisions.
Changing environments. The present work focuses on a setting where the true risk scores of
the underlying population does not change; that is, we assumed that the Bayes optimal predictor p∗
remains fixed while producing better and better refinements. In real life, the true risk of individuals
may change as their environment changes, and possibly even as a result of the prior decisions
made by the lender, as suggested by [LDR+18]. An exciting direction for future investigation
would study a setting of dynamic p∗, with the goal of ensuring long-term fairness and impact.
A specific challenge is finding an efficient (in terms of sample and time complexity) procedure
for maintaining calibration when p∗ changes over time. Further, we showed the importance of
increasing informativeness of predictors for underrepresented populations, but required access to
random samples from this population. In settings where random exploration may cause harm to
uncertain populations (e.g. by raising the default rate) how can we improve information without
causing the inherent capabilities of sensitive subpopulations to deteriorate?
Conclusion. We reiterate that the validity of every notion of fairness rests on some set of as-
sumptions. Many approaches to fair classification assume implicitly that the predicted risk scores
represent the true risk scores. Predicted risk scores are the result of an extensive pipeline of data
collection and computational modeling; when data is limited for minority populations and modeling
is focused on fidelity in the majority populations, the resulting predictions may not be appropriately
informative in the minority. In the case that the differences arise because of suboptimal predictions,
increasing information through refinements provide a simple but effective approach for improving
the utility, fairness, and impact of the decision-maker’s policy.
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A Measuring information through Shannon entropy
For completeness, we briefly discuss how to relate the notions of information defined in Section 3 to
an analogous notion of information, defined through Shannon entropy. In particular, rather than
defining information content in terms of the variance of y given z(x), we could have defined it in
terms of the Shannon entropy of this random variable. In particular, the entropy of a Bernoulli
random variable with expectation p is captured by the binary entropy function H2(p) where
H2(p) = −p · log(p)− (1− p) · log(1− p).
For a calibrated predictor z : X → [0, 1], let IentS (z) = 1 − Ex∼S [H2(x)] denote the entropic
information content, parameterized by the binary entropy (rather than variance). The binary
entropy H2(p) always upper bounds the scaled variance 4 ·p(1−p), with equality at p ∈ {0, 1/2, 1}.
As a consequence, the following inequality holds.
IentS (z) ≤ IS(z)
When information is parameterized by entropy, the corresponding natural notion of “information
loss” is parameterized by the expected KL-divergence. Specifically, denote by DKL(p; q) the KL-
divergence between two Bernoulli distributions with expectations p and q, respectively, defined
as
DKL(p; q) = p · log
(
p
q
)
+ (1− p) · log
(
1− p
1− q
)
.
Again, for a calibrated predictor z : X → [0, 1], let LentS (p∗; z) = Ex∼S [DKL(p∗(x); q(x))] denote
the entropic information loss. We can relate the information loss (based on squared error) to the
entropic information loss (based on KL-divergence).
Proposition A.1. For a calibrated predictor z : X → [0, 1], where supp(z) ⊆ {0, 1} ∪ [α, 1−α] for
some constant α > 0, the entropic information loss is within a constant factor of the information
loss.
LS(p
∗; z) ≤ 2 ln(2) · LentS (p∗; z) ≤
1
α
· LS(p∗; z)
Proposition A.1 is a direct corollary of Pinsker’s inequality, which relates the KL-divergence to the
statistical distance between two probability distributions. As in Proposition 3.1 we can show that
this entropic information loss can be expressed as a difference in entropic information content for
calibrated predictors.
Proposition A.2. Let p∗ : X → [0, 1] denote the Bayes optimal predictor. Suppose for S ⊆ X ,
z : X → [0, 1] is calibrated on S. Then,
LentS (p
∗; z) = Ient(p∗)− Ient(z).
Proof. Again, we expand the entropic information loss and rearrange.
E
x∼S
[DKL(p
∗(x); z(x))] = E
x∼S
[
p∗(x) · log
(
p∗(x)
z(x)
)
+ (1− p∗(x)) · log
(
p∗(x)
1− z(x)
)]
= E
x∼S
[
p∗(x) · log
(
1
z(x)
)
+ (1− p∗(x)) · log
(
1
1− z(x)
)]
− E
x∼S
[H2(p
∗(x))]
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Leveraging the fact that z is calibrated, we expand the first term as follows.
E
x∼S
[
p∗(x) · log
(
1
z(x)
)
+ (1− p∗(x)) · log
(
1
1− z(x)
)]
=
∑
v∈supp(z)
RzS(v) · E
x∼Sv
[
p∗(x) · log
(
1
Ex′∼Sv [p∗(x′)]
)
+ (1− p∗(x)) · log
(
1
1−Ex′∼Sv [p∗(x′)]
)]
=
∑
v∈supp(z)
RzS(v) ·
(
E
x∼Sv
[p∗(x)] · log
(
1
Ex∼Sv [p∗(x)]
)
+ (1− E
x∼Sv
[p∗(x)]) · log
(
1
1−Ex∼Sv [p∗(x)]
))
=
∑
v∈supp(z)
RzS(v) ·H2
(
E
x∼Sv
[p∗(x)]
)
=
∑
v∈supp(z)
RzS(v) ·H2(v)
= E
x∼S
[H2(z(x))]
Thus, combining the equlaities, we see that
LentS (p
∗; z) = E
x∼S
[H2(z(x))]− E
x∼S
[H2(p
∗(x))] = IentS (p
∗)− IentS (z).
As a final note, we observe that the entropic information content of a calibrated predictor can be
related to the expected log-likelihood of the predictor. Specifically, given a collection of labeled
data (x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym) where yi ∼ Ber(p∗(xi)), the likelihood function L(z; {(xi, yi)}) is given
as follows.
L(z; {(xi, yi)}) =
m∏
i=1
z(xi)
yi · (1− z(xi))1−yi
As such, we say the normalized log-likelihood `(z; {(xi, yi)}) is given as
`(z; {(xi, yi)}) = 1
m
m∑
i=1
yi · log(z(xi)) + (1− yi) · log(1− z(xi)).
Suppose the samples (x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym) are drawn such that each xi ∈ S for some subset S ⊆ X ,
then the expected log-likelihood of z is given as follows.
E
xi∼S
yi∼Ber(p∗(x))
[`(z; {(xi, yi)})] = E
x∼S
y∼Ber(p∗(x))
[y · log(z(x)) + (1− y) · log(1− z(x))]
= E
x∼S
[p∗(x) · log(z(x)) + (1− p∗(x)) · log(1− z(x))]
= − E
x∼S
[H2(z(x))] (15)
= IentS (z)− 1
where (15) follows from the analysis above given in the proof of Proposition A.2. In other words,
as we increase the information content of a calibrated predictor, in expectation, the likelihood of
the predictor increases (in expectation over a fresh sample of data). At the extreme, the calibrated
predictor that maximizes the expected likelihood is p∗.
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